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The Court of Appeal has given a further judgment in Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA Civ 463, 
which some in the media have dubbed the ‘cowshed Cinderella’ case. The £1.3 million award that 
had been thought necessary to satisfy the claimant’s estoppel equity at first instance was reduced to 
£500,000.  
 
When Eirian Davies was 17 in 1985, it became clear that she was the only one of her parents’ 
daughters who was interested in taking over their farm. Her parents indicated that she would 
ultimately have the farming business, but it was understood that she would work on it in return. The 
relationship between Eirian and her parents, however, was extremely complex, encompassing inter 
alia arguments, differing representations following those arguments, acquisitions of farmland, 
periods when she was not working on the farm, periods when she was being paid for her work 
there, periods of living on the farm rent-free, periods of external employment (later given up), a 
period where she mistakenly believed that she was a partner in the farming business (later 
incorporated), her being shown a draft will in 2009 in which she was left the land, buildings and a 
share in the company (albeit that she knew it was later varied), and concessions that she had no 
expectations relating to the farm for a period before that beginning in 2001.  
 
After the parties’ relationship completely broke down in 2012 and Eirian issued proceedings, the 
judge nevertheless held ([2013] EWHC 2623 (Ch)) that her parents had made relevant 
representations on which Eirian reasonably relied. Detriment was established on the basis that she 
had not been fully recompensed for her work on the farm and had given up more lucrative and 
attractive employment elsewhere. In a 2014 judgment ([2014] EWCA Civ 568, [2014] Fam Law 
1252), the Court of Appeal upheld the judge’s findings on these matters, and asserted that it was 
unconscionable for the parents to deny her an estoppel equity over the farm. 
 
Subsequently ([2015] EWHC 015 (Ch)), the judge sought to satisfy the equity in the context of a 
farming enterprise worth some £3.15 million.  He found that, despite its varying nature, ‘[t]he 
essence of the expectation was that in reality Eirian was the only person who could fulfil her 
parents’ wishes of keeping the business in the family after their days’ (para [38]). He held that, 
whatever it might be, the expectation was ‘an appropriate starting point’ (para [35]). It was 
recognised, however, that this was not a case where ‘the expected benefit and the expected 
detriment were equivalent or not disproportionate’, in light of the differing representations, the fact 
that at one time she had no expectations regarding the farm, and the fact that the condition of her 
working on the farm was not always fulfilled (para [33]). It could not be said that ‘Eirian positioned 
her whole life on the basis of her parents’ assurances’ (para [34]). The judge concluded that the 
proportionate remedy was a £1.3 million lump sum, representing approximately a third of the farm 
and farming business’ value, which he saw as ‘a fair reflection of the expectation and detriment and 
other factors’ (para [56)]). 
 
In allowing the parents’ appeal ([2016] EWCA Civ 463), the Court of Appeal acknowledged the 
scholarly debate over the relative weight that should be attached to expectation and detriment when 
satisfying the equity. While declining to resolve it, Lewison LJ opined that ‘[i]f…the detriment can 
be fairly quantified and a claimant receives full compensation for that detriment, that compensation 
ought, in principle, to remove the foundation of the claim’ (para [39]).  He endorsed counsel’s 
suggestion that there might be ‘a sliding scale by which the clearer the expectation, the greater the 
detriment and the longer the passage of time during which the expectation was reasonably held, the 
greater would be the weight that should be given to the expectation’ (para [41]; cf Lord Walker, 
‘Which Side “Ought to Win”? – Discretion and Certainty in Property Law’ [2008] Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 229, 239). 
 
In the case at hand, Lewison LJ held that the judge had taken an excessively broad-brush approach 
and neglected to analyse the facts with sufficient rigour or sufficiently to explain his conclusions. In 
particular, the judge ‘did not explain which expectation out of the many he found he regarded as the 
starting point’ (para [42]), which Lewison LJ clearly considered fatal where there was ‘a series of 
different (and sometimes mutually incompatible) expectations, some of which were repudiated by 
Eirian herself, others of which were superseded by later expectations’ (para [48]). 
 
The Court of Appeal also criticised the judge for failing to analyse properly an offer of £350,000 
made by the parents, which comprised an accommodation element, a partnership element, a 
company element, and an element representing the extent to which Eirian had been underpaid for 
her work. Much of it went towards satisfying expectation, and (for example) the mere fact that there 
was no suggestion that the business might be carried on elsewhere did not inevitably mean that any 
promise related to the unencumbered freehold of the land. The only possible explanations for his 
bridging the gap between the £350,000 and the £1.3 million were, firstly, that he attributed a value 
around £1 million to the non-financial aspects of the detrimental reliance (i.e. her sacrificing the 
opportunity to work shorter hours in a less stressful environment), and/or, secondly, that he ascribed 
a very large value to the disappointment of Eirian’s expectation of inheriting the land (as distinct 
from the business and the herd).  
 
On the first point, Lewison LJ noted that (in light of the current state of her relationship with her 
parents) Eirian ‘was now free to do all that which the judge said that she had given up’, and that her 
employment situation was retrievable after detriment lasting five years at most (para [65]). On the 
second, she had lost any expectation of inheritance until the draft will was shown to her in 2009, 
and the new expectation was short-lived. Taking into account these factors, delayed payment and 
changes in monetary value (but also countervailingly early payment in relation to future 
expectations), the Court of Appeal increased the offer by £150,000 to produce £500,000.   
 
Davies is an admirably principled judgment from the Court of Appeal on what was hardly the 
strongest estoppel claim. It is arguably a counter-example of trends of remedial generosity and 
appellate deference identified by John Mee, ‘Proprietary Estoppel and Inheritance: Enough is 
Enough?’ [2013] Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 280, although Eirian Davies by no means went 
away empty-handed. 
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